01 · CWE-798, CWE-540, CWE-200 · OWASP A02:2021, A05:2021 · ASVS V6, V14
Secrets & files
Committed keys and exposed config files are the fastest way an app is taken over. Jikida scans your repo and your live site for both.
Checks
- .gitignore completeness. Confirm
.env, *.pem, *.key, service-account JSON and *.db are ignored and not already tracked.
- Committed secrets. Grep history and HEAD for keys: Stripe
sk_live_, AWS AKIA…, GitHub ghp_, private keys and passwords.
- Live file exposure. Request
/.env, /.git/config, /config.php.bak and /.DS_Store — a 200 means the file is public.
- Directory listing. Check that the server does not auto-index folders such as
/uploads/ or /backups/.
- Source maps in production. Confirm
.map files are not shipped — they leak the original source and inline comments.
Fixes
- Remove and rotate. Delete the secret, rotate it at the provider (removing from HEAD is not enough — it stays in history), then load it from an env var.
- Purge history. Rewrite history with
git filter-repo or BFG, then force-push. Every collaborator must re-clone.
- Block file access. Deny dotfiles at the web server. In nginx:
location ~ /\. { deny all; }. Serve only your public root.
02 · CWE-311, CWE-319, CWE-693 · OWASP A02:2021, A05:2021 · ASVS V1, V9
Network protection
Traffic that leaves the browser in clear text, or a firewall left open, exposes users and back-end services. Check both the edge and the transport.
Checks
- TLS everywhere. Confirm HTTP redirects to HTTPS with a 301 and that no page loads over plain
http://.
- Certificate health. Check the certificate is valid, not expired, and covers the exact host — no self-signed or hostname mismatch.
- Weak TLS versions. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1 and weak ciphers (RC4, 3DES). Serve TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only.
- Open admin ports. Confirm database ports (3306, 5432, 6379, 27017) and SSH are not reachable from the public internet.
- Mixed content. Look for images, scripts or fetch calls loaded over
http:// on an HTTPS page.
Fixes
- Force HTTPS. Redirect all HTTP to HTTPS at the edge and add HSTS:
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains.
- Close ports. Bind services to
127.0.0.1 or a private network, and put firewall rules in front of every host.
- Modern TLS config. Adopt the Mozilla "intermediate" profile: TLS 1.2+, forward secrecy, and OCSP stapling.
04 · CWE-287, CWE-384, CWE-613, CWE-620 · OWASP A07:2021 · ASVS V2, V3
Auth & sessions
Login and session handling are where most account takeovers begin. Weak cookies, missing rate limits, and broken resets do the damage.
Checks
- Cookie flags. Confirm session cookies set
HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite=Lax or Strict.
- Brute-force limits. Check that login, OTP and reset endpoints rate-limit by IP and account, and lock after repeated failures.
- Session fixation. Confirm the session ID is regenerated on login and destroyed on logout.
- Password policy. Look for a minimum length (12+), a breached-password check, and no silent truncation.
- Reset token strength. Confirm reset tokens are random, single-use, and expire within an hour.
Fixes
- Harden cookies. Set all three flags and a short idle timeout. Never store the session token in
localStorage.
- Add MFA. Offer TOTP or a passkey (WebAuthn) and require it for admin accounts.
- Rate-limit auth paths. Add a fixed-window or token-bucket limit plus exponential back-off on failed logins.
05 · CWE-327, CWE-328, CWE-330, CWE-916 · OWASP A02:2021 · ASVS V6, V2.4
Cryptography
Home-made or outdated crypto fails quietly. The usual faults are old hashes, static IVs, and weak randomness.
Checks
- Password hashing. Confirm passwords use bcrypt, scrypt or Argon2 — never MD5, SHA-1 or plain SHA-256.
- Weak algorithms. Look for MD5, SHA-1, DES or ECB mode anywhere in the code.
- Random source. Confirm tokens use a CSPRNG (
crypto.randomBytes, random_bytes) — not Math.random() or rand().
- IV and nonce reuse. Check that a fresh random IV is used per message and never hard-coded.
- Encrypt-then-MAC. Confirm authenticated encryption (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) rather than raw CBC.
Fixes
- Use a vetted library. Replace custom crypto with libsodium or your platform WebCrypto. Do not build your own primitives.
- Upgrade hashes. Move to Argon2id for passwords and re-hash on next login. Store the parameters with the hash.
- Fix randomness. Swap every predictable RNG for a CSPRNG when generating tokens, salts or session IDs.
06 · CWE-347, CWE-345, CWE-1270 · OWASP A02:2021, A07:2021 · ASVS V3.5
JWT security
JSON Web Tokens are easy to misuse. The classic faults are accepting <code>alg=none</code>, confusing algorithms, and never expiring a token.
Checks
- alg=none. Confirm the verifier rejects tokens signed with
alg: none or an empty signature.
- Algorithm confusion. Pin the expected algorithm. An RS256 verifier that accepts HS256 can be forged with the public key.
- Expiry and audience. Check that
exp, iss and aud are validated, not just decoded.
- Sensitive claims. Confirm no passwords or secrets sit in the payload — a JWT is signed, not encrypted.
- Revocation. Look for a way to revoke a token before
exp, such as a short lifetime plus a deny-list.
Fixes
- Pin the algorithm. Pass an explicit allow-list to
verify, for example algorithms: ['RS256'], and refuse everything else.
- Short lifetimes. Issue access tokens that live minutes, with a rotating refresh token stored server-side.
- Validate every claim. Reject a token whose
exp has passed or whose aud and iss do not match your service.
07 · CWE-89, CWE-566, CWE-284, CWE-639 · OWASP A01:2021, A03:2021 · ASVS V4, V5
Database security
A database open to the world, or a rule set to allow everyone, exposes every row. Vibe-coded Firebase and Supabase projects fail here most.
Checks
- Supabase RLS. Confirm Row Level Security is enabled on every table. A table with RLS off is fully readable through the anon key.
- Firebase rules. Look for
allow read, write: if true; — that opens the whole database to anyone.
- Public exposure. Check the database is not reachable from the public internet and uses a strong, non-default password.
- IDOR on records. Confirm a user cannot read another user's row by changing an ID in the URL or query.
- Backup exposure. Check that dumps and
.sql backups are not stored in a public bucket or web root.
Fixes
- Enable RLS with policies. Turn on RLS, then add a policy such as
auth.uid() = user_id so each user sees only their own rows.
- Lock Firebase rules. Replace
if true with if request.auth != null && request.auth.uid == resource.data.ownerId.
- Scope every query. Filter by the authenticated user server-side. Never trust an ID from the client to pick the row.
08 · CWE-732, CWE-522, CWE-829 · OWASP A05:2021, A08:2021 · ASVS V1, V14
Deployment & CI/CD
The pipeline handles your most powerful credentials. A leaked CI secret or an over-privileged runner can push a backdoor to production.
Checks
- Secrets in CI logs. Confirm tokens are masked and never echoed in build output or error traces.
- Pull-request trust. Check that workflows from forks cannot read repo secrets, for example via
pull_request_target.
- Pinned actions. Confirm third-party CI actions are pinned to a commit SHA, not a mutable tag like
@v3.
- Least-privilege tokens. Look for a workflow token scoped to read-only unless write is truly needed.
- Environment separation. Confirm staging and production use different credentials and cannot cross-connect.
Fixes
- Use the secret store. Keep credentials in the CI secret manager, mask them, and rotate on any suspected leak.
- Pin and review. Pin actions to a SHA and require review before a new third-party action enters the pipeline.
- Scope permissions down. Set
permissions: contents: read by default and grant write per job only when required.
09 · CWE-250, CWE-269, CWE-1104 · OWASP A05:2021, A06:2021 · ASVS V14.1
Docker security
Containers built as root, from stale bases, or with secrets baked in, carry those faults straight to production.
Checks
- Running as root. Confirm the image sets a non-root
USER — a container as root widens any escape.
- Secrets in layers. Check that no
ENV or COPY bakes a key or .env into an image layer, where it stays forever.
- Base image freshness. Confirm the base image is current and scanned — pin a digest, not a floating
latest.
- Exposed sockets. Look for the Docker socket
/var/run/docker.sock mounted into a container — that equals host root.
- Capabilities and privilege. Confirm containers do not run
--privileged and drop capabilities they do not need.
Fixes
- Drop to non-root. Add
USER app and a read-only root filesystem. Grant back only the capabilities you need.
- Multi-stage builds. Build in one stage and copy only artefacts to a slim final image, so no build secret survives.
- Scan images. Run an image scan in CI and fail the build on known critical CVEs in the base or packages.
10 · CWE-346, CWE-1385, CWE-942, CWE-352 · OWASP A05:2021, A07:2021 · ASVS V13, V3
Protocols
CORS, WebSockets and postMessage all cross origins. A loose origin check hands your API or messages to any site.
Checks
- CORS wildcard. Confirm the API does not return
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * together with Allow-Credentials: true.
- Reflected origin. Check the server does not echo any
Origin header back as allowed — that trusts every site.
- WebSocket origin. Confirm WebSocket handshakes validate the
Origin header and authenticate the connection.
- postMessage target. Look for
postMessage(data, '*') and receivers that skip an event.origin check.
- CSRF on state changes. Confirm POST, PUT and DELETE require a CSRF token or a checked custom header.
Fixes
- Allow-list origins. Match
Origin against a fixed allow-list and reflect only known hosts. Never pair * with credentials.
- Check message origin. On both ends, set an exact target origin and verify
event.origin before trusting the payload.
- Authenticate sockets. Validate the origin and a token at the WebSocket handshake, not after the connection opens.
11 · CWE-918, CWE-611, CWE-1321, CWE-444 · OWASP A03:2021, A10:2021 · ASVS V5, V12
Advanced attacks
SSRF, XXE, prototype pollution and request smuggling reach past the front door into internal systems. They need targeted checks.
Checks
- SSRF. Confirm any server-side fetch of a user URL blocks internal ranges and the cloud metadata IP
169.254.169.254.
- XXE. Check XML parsers disable external entities and DTD loading before parsing untrusted input.
- Prototype pollution. Look for deep merges or
JSON.parse paths that let __proto__ or constructor reach the object prototype.
- Request smuggling. Confirm the front proxy and back-end agree on
Content-Length versus Transfer-Encoding.
- Deserialization. Check that untrusted data is never passed to native deserializers like PHP
unserialize or Java readObject.
Fixes
- Contain SSRF. Allow-list destination hosts, resolve and re-check the IP, and block link-local and private ranges.
- Disable XML entities. Turn off external entities and DTDs (
LIBXML_NOENT off, disallowDoctypeDecl on) or use JSON instead.
- Guard object merges. Reject dangerous keys, freeze the prototype, or use a
Map instead of a plain object for untrusted data.
12 · CWE-89, CWE-79, CWE-78, CWE-943 · OWASP A03:2021 · ASVS V5.3
Injection
Injection is still the top web risk. Any place untrusted input meets a query, a shell, or the DOM is a target.
Checks
- SQL injection. Confirm queries use parameters, not string concatenation. Flag
"... WHERE id = " + input patterns.
- Cross-site scripting. Look for user input written into HTML without escaping, and
innerHTML or dangerouslySetInnerHTML on raw data.
- Command injection. Check no user input reaches a shell via
exec, system or backticks without strict validation.
- NoSQL injection. Confirm query objects reject operator keys like
{$gt: ''} passed from the client.
- Template injection. Look for user input rendered as a template expression, not just as data.
Fixes
- Parameterize queries. Replace concatenation with prepared statements:
db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [id]).
- Escape on output. Encode by context — HTML, attribute, JS or URL — and prefer
textContent over innerHTML.
- Avoid the shell. Call binaries with an argument array (
execFile), never a string, and validate every input against an allow-list.
13 · CWE-362, CWE-367, CWE-366 · OWASP A04:2021 · ASVS V11.1
Race conditions
When two requests hit the same record at once, checks that looked safe can double-spend or over-issue. Concurrency needs its own review.
Checks
- Check-then-act. Look for read-verify-write flows on balances, stock or quotas that are not atomic under parallel requests.
- Double submission. Confirm coupon redemption, payment capture and vote actions cannot run twice concurrently.
- Missing locks. Check that critical updates use a transaction with row locking (
SELECT ... FOR UPDATE) or an atomic counter.
- TOCTOU on files. Look for a file that is checked, then opened in a separate step, letting an attacker swap it in between.
Fixes
- Make it atomic. Do the check and update in one statement:
UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - ? WHERE balance >= ?.
- Lock or serialise. Wrap the critical section in a transaction with
FOR UPDATE, or use a distributed lock keyed by the record.
- Idempotency keys. Require a unique key per operation so a retried or duplicated request applies only once.
14 · CWE-434, CWE-22, CWE-646 · OWASP A01:2021, A03:2021 · ASVS V12
File upload
An upload form that trusts the client can drop a web shell or a path-traversal payload onto your server. Validate type, name, and storage.
Checks
- Type validation. Confirm the server checks real file content, not just the extension or the client
Content-Type.
- Executable uploads. Check that
.php, .jsp, .svg and double extensions cannot be uploaded to a served directory.
- Path traversal. Look for a filename with
../ that could write outside the upload folder.
- Malware scanning. Confirm uploads are scanned for malware before they are stored or shared.
- Storage location. Check that uploads are stored outside the web root or on a separate host that cannot execute code.
Fixes
- Validate and rename. Verify the magic bytes, generate a random server-side filename, and set a fixed extension you control.
- Serve from a safe origin. Store uploads off the web root and serve them with
Content-Disposition: attachment and nosniff.
- Scan before use. Run a malware scan on upload and reject anything flagged, failing closed on scanner errors.
15 · CWE-350, CWE-290, CWE-16 · OWASP A05:2021, A07:2021 · ASVS V1.7
DNS & email
A missing SPF record lets anyone spoof your domain, and a dangling DNS record lets an attacker claim your subdomain.
Checks
- SPF record. Confirm an SPF TXT record exists and ends in
-all or ~all to limit who can send as your domain.
- DKIM signing. Check outbound mail is DKIM-signed and the public key is published in DNS.
- DMARC policy. Confirm a DMARC record with a policy of
quarantine or reject, not just p=none.
- Subdomain takeover. Look for CNAME records pointing to a de-provisioned service (an unclaimed bucket, Heroku app or Vercel project).
- Open resolvers and zone transfer. Confirm the DNS server refuses
AXFR zone transfers to the public.
Fixes
- Publish the trio. Add SPF, DKIM and DMARC. Start DMARC at
p=none with reports, then ramp to quarantine and reject.
- Remove stale records. Delete DNS records that point to services you no longer own, and audit CNAMEs regularly.
- Lock down the zone. Disable public zone transfers and restrict record changes to a small, audited set of accounts.
16 · CWE-1104, CWE-829, CWE-494 · OWASP A06:2021, A08:2021 · ASVS V14.2
Supply chain
Most of your code is other people's. A malicious or vulnerable dependency, or a typosquatted package, ships straight into your build.
Checks
- Known CVEs. Run an audit (
npm audit, pip-audit, OSV) and flag dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities.
- Typosquatting. Check package names for look-alikes of popular libraries added by mistake or by an attacker.
- Lockfile integrity. Confirm a committed lockfile pins exact versions and hashes, and installs use it (
npm ci).
- Postinstall scripts. Look for dependencies that run install scripts, a common malware entry point.
- Unmaintained packages. Flag dependencies with no releases for years or a single unverified maintainer.
Fixes
- Pin and verify. Commit a lockfile, install with integrity hashes, and reproduce builds from the pinned tree.
- Patch or replace. Update vulnerable dependencies promptly. If unmaintained, swap for a supported alternative.
- Generate an SBOM. Produce a software bill of materials in CI and scan it on every build to catch new advisories.
17 · CWE-312, CWE-295, CWE-919 · OWASP MASVS · ASVS V6, V9
Mobile security
Mobile apps ship to the user's device, so anything embedded can be extracted. Hard-coded keys and skipped TLS checks are the usual faults.
Checks
- Hard-coded secrets. Confirm no API keys or credentials are compiled into the app binary, where they can be pulled from the package.
- Insecure storage. Check tokens sit in the Keychain or Keystore, not in plain
UserDefaults, SharedPreferences or a flat file.
- TLS validation. Confirm the app does not disable certificate checks or accept any host, and consider certificate pinning.
- Exported components. On Android, look for activities or receivers exported without permission that leak actions to other apps.
- Debug artefacts. Confirm the release build strips logging, debug flags and test back-doors.
Fixes
- Move secrets server-side. Fetch scoped tokens from your back-end at runtime rather than embedding a long-lived key in the app.
- Use platform storage. Store secrets in the Keychain or Android Keystore and require device authentication to unlock them.
- Pin certificates. Enforce TLS validation and pin your certificate or public key so a rogue CA cannot intercept traffic.
18 · CWE-359, CWE-532, CWE-311 · OWASP A09:2021 · ASVS V8, V7
Compliance & GDPR
Handling personal data carries legal duties. The common gaps are excess collection, no consent, and personal data in logs.
Checks
- Data minimisation. Confirm you collect only the personal data you need and delete it when its purpose ends.
- Consent and cookies. Check that non-essential cookies and trackers load only after clear opt-in consent.
- PII in logs. Look for emails, tokens, card numbers or IPs written to application logs in clear text.
- Right to erasure. Confirm there is a working path to export and delete a user's data on request.
- Encryption at rest. Check that personal and sensitive data is encrypted in the database and in backups.
Fixes
- Redact logs. Filter personal data before it reaches the log sink, and set a short retention on log storage.
- Build erasure in. Add data-export and delete endpoints, and cascade the delete across backups and third parties.
- Document processing. Keep a record of what you collect, why, and for how long, and gate trackers behind consent.
19 · CWE-778, CWE-223, CWE-117 · OWASP A09:2021 · ASVS V7
Monitoring & detection
You cannot respond to what you cannot see. Missing logs and no alerting turn a small breach into a long one.
Checks
- Security event logging. Confirm logins, failures, privilege changes and admin actions are logged with a timestamp and actor.
- Alerting. Check that spikes in failed logins, 5xx errors or new admin accounts raise an alert, not just a log line.
- Log tampering. Confirm logs ship off-host to a store the application cannot rewrite or delete.
- Uptime and change watch. Look for monitoring that catches downtime, a defaced page or an unexpected content change quickly.
- Log injection. Confirm user input written to logs is encoded so it cannot forge fake log entries.
Fixes
- Centralise logs. Ship logs to an external, append-only store with a defined retention, separate from the app host.
- Alert on the signals. Set thresholds on auth failures, error rates and admin changes, routed to a channel someone watches.
- Watch the live site. Add uptime and content-change monitoring so a defacement or outage pages you within minutes.
20 · CWE-284, CWE-668, CWE-269 · OWASP A01:2021, A05:2021 · ASVS V1, V14
Serverless & edge
Functions and edge workers remove servers but keep the risks. Over-broad roles, leaked env vars, and public endpoints are the usual issues.
Checks
- Over-privileged roles. Confirm each function has a scoped IAM role, not a wildcard
Action: * that can touch every resource.
- Environment secrets. Check secrets come from a secret manager, not plain function env vars visible in the console or logs.
- Public endpoints. Look for function URLs or API routes exposed without authentication or a rate limit.
- Injection at the edge. Confirm edge middleware validates input the same as origin code, since it runs before your app.
- Event-source trust. Check that events from queues, webhooks or storage are verified before they trigger sensitive work.
Fixes
- Scope IAM tightly. Give each function only the actions and resources it needs, and separate roles per function.
- Use a secret store. Pull secrets at runtime from a managed store and keep them out of env vars and deploy logs.
- Authenticate every trigger. Verify webhook signatures and require auth on function URLs, with a rate limit at the edge.
21 · CWE-1006, CWE-489, CWE-561 · OWASP A04:2021, A06:2021 · ASVS V1, V10
Source-code analysis
Static analysis reads the code to find faults no live scan can reach — dead debug routes, unsafe patterns, and risky data flows.
Checks
- Dangerous functions. Grep for
eval, exec, pickle.loads and raw deserialisers reachable from user input.
- Tainted data flow. Trace request input to a sink (query, shell, HTML) to find paths that skip validation or escaping.
- Debug and test routes. Look for debug endpoints,
console.log of secrets, or test back-doors left in the code.
- Hard-coded config. Confirm no credentials, IPs or feature flags are hard-coded where an env var should be.
- Insecure defaults. Check for disabled TLS checks, permissive CORS, or auth toggled off "for now" in the code.
Fixes
- Run SAST in CI. Add a static scanner to the pipeline and fail the build on high-severity findings. Run
npx @jikida/scan --repo . locally first.
- Remove debug paths. Strip debug routes and verbose logging from release builds, and gate any diagnostic behind auth.
- Triage, do not mute. Fix or explicitly justify each finding. Suppress only with a documented reason, not a blanket ignore.
22 · CWE-1427, CWE-77, CWE-200 · OWASP LLM Top 10 · ASVS V5, V13
AI / LLM security
Language models blur data and instructions. Prompt injection, leaked system prompts, and unchecked tool calls are the new attack surface.
Checks
- Prompt injection. Confirm untrusted content (a web page, a document, a user field) cannot override system instructions.
- Output handling. Check that model output is escaped or validated before it is rendered, run as code, or used in a query.
- Tool and agent limits. Confirm tools the model can call are scoped and that risky actions need confirmation or a permission check.
- Data leakage. Look for secrets or other users' data in the context window that the model could repeat back.
- Rate and cost limits. Check per-user limits so a prompt loop cannot drain your quota or budget.
Fixes
- Separate instructions from data. Keep untrusted content in a clearly marked data channel and never concatenate it into the system prompt.
- Treat output as untrusted. Validate and escape model output like any user input before it reaches a sink or a tool call.
- Constrain tools. Give the model least-privilege tools, add allow-lists, and require confirmation for destructive actions.
23 · CWE-770, CWE-799, CWE-307 · OWASP A04:2021, A07:2021 · ASVS V11.1
Bot & DDoS
Automated traffic scrapes data, stuffs credentials, and floods resources. Rate limits and abuse detection keep the app standing.
Checks
- Rate limiting. Confirm expensive endpoints (login, search, export, signup) are rate-limited per IP and per account.
- Credential stuffing. Check for defence against high-volume login attempts using leaked username and password pairs.
- Resource exhaustion. Look for endpoints with no size or page limit that a single request can use to exhaust memory or CPU.
- Scraping controls. Confirm public data endpoints have limits and detection for bulk automated collection.
- CAPTCHA and challenge. Check that a challenge triggers on suspicious patterns without blocking normal users.
Fixes
- Layer rate limits. Apply per-IP and per-account token buckets, with a global cap, and back-off on repeated abuse.
- Add abuse detection. Score requests on velocity, IP reputation and behaviour, and step up to a challenge when a score is high.
- Put a WAF at the edge. Filter known bad traffic and volumetric floods before they reach your origin.
24 · CWE-79, CWE-1004, CWE-451 · OWASP A05:2021 · ASVS V14.4, V3.4
Browser APIs
Powerful browser features can be turned against the user. Storage, permissions, and third-party scripts all need constraints.
Checks
- Storage of secrets. Confirm tokens are not kept in
localStorage, where any XSS can read them — prefer an HttpOnly cookie.
- Permissions policy. Check a
Permissions-Policy header limits camera, microphone, geolocation and other powerful features.
- Third-party scripts. Confirm external scripts use Subresource Integrity (
integrity) so a tampered file is rejected.
- Clickjacking of features. Look for sensitive actions that can be framed and triggered without the user's intent.
- Sensitive data in the DOM. Check that secrets or full card numbers are not placed into the DOM or browser history.
Fixes
- Cookie over localStorage. Hold session tokens in an
HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite cookie so scripts cannot read them.
- Add SRI. Pin third-party scripts with an integrity hash and
crossorigin, and self-host where you can.
- Restrict features. Set a tight
Permissions-Policy and frame-ancestors so features cannot be abused from a frame.
25 · CWE-451, CWE-346, CWE-693 · OWASP A05:2021, A08:2021 · ASVS V14, V1
Modern security
New platform defences close old gaps — but only when you turn them on. These are the controls a modern app should adopt.
Checks
- Trusted Types. Check whether Trusted Types are enforced via CSP to shut down DOM-based XSS at the sink.
- Cross-origin isolation. Confirm COOP and COEP headers are set where you use powerful APIs or need
SharedArrayBuffer.
- Cookie prefixes. Look for the
__Host- prefix on session cookies to bind them to the exact origin and path.
- Passkeys. Check whether WebAuthn passkeys are offered as a phishing-resistant login option.
- Subresource and CSP reporting. Confirm CSP
report-to is set so violations are collected and reviewed.
Fixes
- Enforce Trusted Types. Add
require-trusted-types-for 'script' to CSP and route DOM sinks through a vetted policy.
- Adopt passkeys. Offer WebAuthn passkeys and prefer them over passwords and SMS OTP for a phishing-resistant login.
- Turn on isolation. Set COOP
same-origin and COEP require-corp, plus __Host- cookies, to harden the origin.